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General equilibrium theory (GET) took the entire edifice of economic 
theory by storm during the 1950s. Its elegant existence theorems, proved 
by, among others, Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu (1954) and Lionel 
McKenzie (1959), provided a framework of analysis that made more pre-
cise and sound the main intuitions of the neoclassical school. An even 
more important consequence of these developments may be that they set 
a new and higher standard of mathematical sophistication in economics. 
A remarkable aspect of this new standard was its nonconstructive flavor, 
pretty much in consonance with the postwar predominance of Bourba-
kian mathematics. 
The central role of GET in economics as the backbone of the main-
stream is still uncontested. But its primacy as an all-encompassing theory 
of economic phenomena was challenged at its very inception, because of 
its inability to yield proofs of uniqueness and stability of equilibria from 
general characterizations of preferences and technologies. This lack of 
results, however, did not shake the pervasive use of neoclassical frame-
works in which a system of competitive prices was seen as embodying 
all the relevant information in the economy. This tranquilizing belief 
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suffered a heavy blow from the papers of Hugo Sonnenschein (1973), Rolf 
Mantel (1974), and Debreu (1974). They showed that the only properties 
that can be predicated on aggregate excess demand (which in turn char-
acterizes the competitive equilibria) are continuity, homogeneity of degree 
zero, and the validity of Walras’s law. Other than that, as Andreu Mas-
Colell, Michael Whinston, and Jerry Green (1995, 598) say, “anything 
goes.” These results show that for every given system of equilibrium 
prices and its associated excess demands, an arbitrary economy can be 
defined, exhibiting the same aggregate behavior and the same equilibria. 
That is, prices do not convey all the relevant information about the econ-
omy, since a “mock” one is able to generate the same aggregate demand. 
One of the authors of this result was Mantel. By 1974 he was a profes-
sor of economics at the Universidad de Buenos Aires, in Argentina. His 
seminal paper stems from research done in solitude in Argentina after 
finishing his PhD at Yale in 1965. Unlike Sonnenschein or Debreu, 
Mantel drew many of his intuitions from his work on computability of 
equilibria and particularly from his experience in programming a com-
puter planning system for the Argentinian government in 1971. 
My goal in this article is to show how Mantel’s approach to GET 
was driven by a completely different family of concerns than those that 
guided the work of all other theorists associated with him in the proof of 
the “anything goes” result. Surprising as it may seem, he intended at that 
time to tightly connect economic theory and practice, particularly in the 
field of policymaking. I argue that this explains why he was so con-
cerned, as it will be seen, with computational approaches and did not 
quite follow the Bourbakian path. Another interesting aspect of Mantel’s 
motivations is that his research on the properties and computability of 
equilibria was for him just a component of his wider research agenda on 
the problem of economic development. 
The inevitable conclusion that Mantel drew from his own results was 
that some sort of idiosyncratic “social” information is needed to com-
pute the relative prices that ensure an efficient use of resources in a com-
petitive market. Furthermore, this was for him a particularly pressing 
issue, since any committed policymaker has to take into account those 
social aspects in the design of market institutions intended to promote 
economic development. 
In section 1 I discuss how Mantel’s training in Argentina at the turn of 
the 1960s gave him a view of economics in which theory had to be driven 
by the requirements of the real world, and in particular by the goal of 
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inducing economic development in the country. In section 2 I discuss 
how this vision was initially informed at Yale by his encounters with 
computation and later, back in Argentina, further elaborated in the light 
of Mantel’s work for a planning agency. I claim that this vision inspired 
his 1974 paper. In section 3 I discuss the status of the problem of charac-
terizing excess demand during the 1960s and early 1970s. Finally, in sec-
tion 4 I discuss the conclusions that Mantel drew in his final years from 
his earlier results. 
1.  Mantel’s Background: Economics  
in Argentina at the End of the 1950s
Rolf Ricardo Mantel was born in 1935 to a middle-class family of Swiss 
and German descent. Enrolling in the Universidad de Buenos Aires in 
1954, he intended to pursue a program in accountancy. He saw it as a way 
to combine his interest in economic issues and his prowess in mathemat-
ics while pursuing a profession. 
In those days no program in economics existed at any of the universi-
ties in Argentina.1 The School of Economic Sciences in Buenos Aires 
had, of course, many economists among its faculty, but no organized sys-
tem of research or teaching in the field existed in the early 1950s. More-
over, most of those economists were amateurs (being originally lawyers 
or engineers). At that particular moment, older professors who had ade-
quate training in the neoclassical tradition had retired without leaving 
followers. Most of them were disciples of Hugo Broggi, who did his doc-
torate under David Hilbert in Göttingen and was a close follower of Vil-
fredo Pareto. Broggi’s influence lead to an incipient interest in theoreti-
cal research, José Barral Souto being of particular interest here, since 
he analyzed in 1941 the notion of comparative advantages using linear 
inequations, quite unaware of the transition in mathematical economics 
from calculus-based to convex-analytic methods that was happening at 
the time. 
The only new figures in academic economics were part of an influ-
ential group of Central and Eastern European exiles who found refuge 
in Juan Perón’s Argentina. Many of them had been appointed in pro-
German governments in Europe during World War II. Among them were 
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1. The information about the history of economics in Argentina is drawn from Fernández 
López 2001. 
Stefan Cottely, former head of Hungary’s National Bank, and Florin Mano-
liu, former subsecretary of Romania’s ministry of oil. Many had a more 
academic outlook, like Oreste Popescu and Lascar Saveanu of Romania 
and Uros Bacic from Croatia. They all exhibited a strong historicist bent 
and were active in designing the future programs and academic depart-
ments in economics in several universities outside Buenos Aires. Interest-
ingly enough, these foreign scholars stimulated interest in the analysis of 
the problems of development and policymaking for the Argentinian econ-
omy. They introduced into the rather amateurish style of economics of the 
time a certain patina of Old World scholarship, thus changing the overall 
outlook of the discipline in the country.2 
By 1958 a proper program in economics was created at the Univer-
sidad de Buenos Aires, and Mantel enrolled, already interested in the 
intellectual challenges of the discipline and rather bored of accountancy. 
This program, which led to a degree in political economy (in the older 
usage of the expression), heavily emphasized the applied side, particu-
larly the development and policy problems of Argentina. Mantel excelled, 
exhibiting all his talents, being the more mathematically oriented of a 
group of enthusiastic budding scholars. In this group was also his future 
wife, Ana Martirena,3 as well as other economists who became influen-
tial in the next decades. They convened once a week, under the informal 
direction of Julio H. G. Olivera, a few years their elder. Olivera was origi-
nally a lawyer who became one of the main proponents of the “Latin 
American” version of structuralism. He introduced serious standards of 
research, emphasizing mathematical rigor in the analysis of economic 
issues. Olivera saw immediately that Mantel had enormous potential and 
encouraged him to pursue an academic career, and particularly to get a 
doctoral degree abroad. 
In those years, Mantel became interested in the possibility of using 
economic theory as a foundation for designing policies to promote the 
rapid development of the country. As he would later say, “Every problem 
I cared for concerned economic development.”4 He already clearly dis-
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tinguished the mathematical method in economics from the content, which 
he thought had to be motivated by real-world problems. For example, he 
had a vision about the unavoidability of economic policy and consequently 
about the state’s role in less-developed economies:5
In the contemporary world, the state has an enormous gravitational pull 
over the economy of a country, making it impossible to demand from it 
a “neutral” behavior, in the liberal sense. Practical solutions to this 
problem are manifold, going from the extreme of collectivist solutions, 
in which the intertemporal preferences of the state substitute for indi-
vidual ones, to the alternative of more or less random governmental 
programs created in response to fiscal needs. (Mantel 1999b, 23)
Despite such clear statements, his view of economics always seemed too 
distant from the earthly concerns not only of laymen but also of some of 
his colleagues.6 
The reason for the gap between Mantel and other (most, in fact) Argen-
tinian economists is that they could not see that he shared their interests 
and that a fruitful interaction could easily arise if his formal outlook were 
understood. Of course, he would always be a theoretician, but his preoc-
cupation with the design of the right tools to facilitate economic devel-
opment was at the center of his academic work. 
At the beginning of the 1960s he and his wife got grants from the 
Organization of American States (OAS) to pursue PhDs at Yale. Some 
topics he studied before leaving, particularly the problem of optimal 
development and of the design of stabilization policies, were later revis-
ited by him, in light of his new training.7 
2. Mantel and the Computation of Equilibria
Yale was an exhilarating academic experience for Mantel. He became a 
huge fan of Irving Fisher, a local hero, who had tried to build (but never 
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completed) an analog computer to calculate equilibrium prices in a com-
petitive economy.8 Interested in addressing the same problem, which 
accorded with the interests of the Yale-based Cowles Commission, Mantel 
asked Tjalling Koopmans, who was on his prospectus committee (Michael 
Montias was the other member) to be his thesis adviser. Although Koop-
mans accepted, he was on leave for a while. Mantel changed then to Her-
bert Scarf, fresh from his success in showing in 1960 that competitive 
economies may not have stable equilibria. The dissertation committee, 
however, also included Koopmans, back at Yale, and Menahem Yaari. 
Beyond his interest in computing equilibria, Mantel developed an 
overall fascination with computers from his encounters with the IBM 
mainframes of Yale’s computer lab. Always a constructivist, he wanted 
his theoretical constructions to be backed up by strong evidence. More-
over, he was not willing to accept his own results if they could not be 
tested numerically. The computers allowed him to run complicated 
numerical experiments that were too hard to do by hand. He learned to 
program with punched cards and using the amazingly small RAMs of 
the computers of that time. This interest in computers was lifelong, and 
Mantel later became one of the most dedicated users of computer mod-
els among the economists of Argentina. 
Mantel’s Yale thesis, finished in 1965 and published in 1968, intro-
duced an algorithm for computing equilibria through successive approx-
imations, without making any direct use of fixed-point theorems. His 
goal was to provide an alternative, constructive, form to prove the exis-
tence of equilibrium without having to go through the use of results like 
Kakutani’s theorem. Furthermore, if such an algorithm were available, it 
would be possible to predict future outcomes and determine policies to 
guide the economy. 
I got interested in the problem of calculating equilibria ten years after 
the publication of the proof of their existence in the Walrasian model 
by Arrow and Debreu. I had to choose a topic for my dissertation. Kaku-
tani’s theorem, on which Arrow and Debreu based their proof, allows 
one to affirm that a solution exists, but it gives no indication on how to 
calculate it. Therefore, even if that step forward showed that it could 
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be interesting to apply that model to practical issues, it was still not 
possible to do that effectively, since solutions could be calculated only 
for already well-known special cases. 
I came up with the idea of looking for a different, constructive, form 
to prove the existence of a solution, which at the same time would cal-
culate the equilibrium. In time this model could be used to determine 
economic policies and predict the future of the economy. . . . 
My research was not fruitless, because, as a subproduct, it led to the 
first method to calculate solutions for Walrasian models. . . . I looked 
for a way to calculate equilibrium prices up to a given low margin of 
error. If the supply function has a decreasing section, something that, 
as it is well known, may for instance happen in the labor market, it is 
easy to see that there might exist many price systems for which supply 
and demand are almost coincident. It is always possible to conceive 
sufficiently irregular curves that intersect at any point farther away from 
the ones already represented. The only measure of “closeness” between 
the curves is just the difference between supplied and demanded 
amounts. . . . Any practical algorithm has to take into account such 
measure in order to decide when a point has been reached that for all 
possible purposes may play the role of an equilibrium. (Mantel 1985, 
25, 26, 27, 28) 
Back in Argentina, Mantel became a professor and a researcher at the 
National Council of Research (an agency that funded part of his PhD pro-
gram at Yale). A couple of years later, a former professor, Javier Villa-
nueva, who was in charge of a recently created National Council of Devel-
opment, hired him, giving Mantel the freedom to pursue his dream of 
using computers to determine policies to promote economic develop-
ment. He implemented to a certain extent his own algorithm, although 
with substantial changes because of the requirement he imposed on him-
self that the planning program had to be validated and calibrated with 
real-world data. 
The present state of both the science of economics and the art of com-
puting does no longer justify the mere verbal and qualitative analysis 
of complex economic systems, based only in making explicit a few 
variables. . . . Our discipline resembles a bit meteorology, where long-
term prediction is extremely hard. But, like that science which, mostly 
thanks to the advances in computation and the enormous amount of 
money devoted to amass basic information, is now able to save lives 
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thanks to its forecasts of severe atmospheric disturbances, in econom-
ics we might be able to indicate the most probable effects of economic 
policies and improve the situation of a country. 
The theory of economic policymaking is a branch of decision the-
ory. The latter analyzes the elements that must be considered by the 
agent responsible for making the decision—in our case the planner—in 
order to determine the optimal action in a rational way. . . . The scarce 
resources of the organism in charge of the design of the plan may be 
better spent by focusing on the technical problem of finding an efficient 
plan [instead of an optimal one]. That is, once the relevant variables are 
determined, the goal should be to find a plan in which the degree in 
which any goal is attained cannot be improved without lowering the 
attainment of another goal. . . .
These ideas began to be implemented in our country. In 1971 the 
author was hired by the Secretary of the National Council of Develop-
ment to prepare a planning model. . . . This system consists of a series 
of computer programs that allow an efficient use of the available infor-
mation as well as an adequate interaction between the computer and the 
human staff. . . .
The second variant does not require an explicit welfare function but 
the direct interaction with a policymaker, who might indicate at each 
iteration a direction of preferences and determine the optimal level by 
observing the rates of substitution among the attainment degrees of the 
goals of the plan. (Mantel 1999f, 163, 167, 170, 172)
One of the customary coups in Argentina at that time ended this project. 
But it left Mantel with many problems to think about. One was determin-
ing the minimal requirements of information for computing equilibrium. 
Although this was motivated by a concrete problem, he saw its theoretical 
content immediately. He discovered that, even if he wanted to avoid the 
use of fixed-point theorems, hidden in his algorithm was a procedure that 
ended up minimizing the gap between demand and supply functions, 
which worked only in those cases in which Brouwer’s or Kakutani’s theo-
rems could be applied. An interesting aside of this development is that 
Scarf realized immediately that Mantel’s algorithm did more than approx-
imate equilibria. He began his own research and published an influential 
book on the subject in 1973, as Mantel (1985, 28, 29) acknowledges: 
Regrettably, I did not realize that I was asking the wrong question. I 
looked for a method for approximating the solution and this is not 
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possible in general. Scarf asked the right question and today the algo-
rithm carries his name. . . . Scarf understood that what matters is not 
whether the solution found by the algorithm is close to the true one. It 
suffices to find prices for which supply and demand are almost equal.
In Scarf’s book little mention is made of Mantel’s result. Mantel resented 
this, although, as the previous quote indicates, he always credited Scarf 
for realizing that a close relation exists between algorithms to compute 
equilibria and mathematical fixed-point theorems. This realization led 
Mantel to think about how unavoidable those mathematical results are 
and their relation with the overall information carried by equilibria. 
3. The Characterization  
of Aggregate Excess Demand
The connection between his algorithm and Kakutani’s theorem triggered 
Mantel’s interest in determining whether there could exist equilibria in 
competitive markets that do not obtain as fixed points. A partial answer to 
this question was given by Hirofumi Uzawa (1962), who claimed that the 
existence of a Walrasian equilibrium implies Brouwer’s (and by extension 
Kakutani’s) theorem. 
While preparing his Yale thesis, Mantel was already aware of Uzawa’s 
result. But at that time he thought it was highly dependent on assuming 
that global demand and supply functions were continuous, homogeneous 
of degree zero, and obeyed Walras’s law. Mantel (1985, 26–27) felt that 
this characterization was excessively restrictive: 
From a logical point of view, the existence of a solution for the Walra-
sian model is equivalent to the existence of a fixed point of transfor-
mations that verify the hypotheses of Kakutani’s theorem, in the sense 
that the existence of equilibrium can be proved on the basis of this 
theorem, and, conversely, it is possible to prove Kakutani’s theorem 
up from the hypothesis of the existence of a competitive equilibrium 
in the Walrasian model, independently of the functional relations that 
can be adopted. 
This last equivalence had been proved by Hirofumi Uzawa a few 
years before [Mantel’s work on his dissertation], but at that time it was 
unclear whether the supply and demand functions used by him, i.e., 
arbitrary functions except of being continuous, homogeneous of degree 
zero, and satisfying Walras’s law, could be obtained by aggregation up 
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from individual demand functions obtained from the maximization of 
preferences and individual supply functions resulting from the maxi-
mization of profits by producers.
In fact, he had already found instances of excess demand functions that 
did not satisfy those properties, as for example in the case of the inter-
action among economies in which factors can move freely from one to 
another: 
In 1967 Dr. Mantel extended the theorem of no equivalence [between 
equilibria in international trade under free trade and perfect factor 
mobility], pointing out that the existence of equilibrium under free 
trade cannot be replicated in the free mobility case since there can 
exist discontinuities (“holes” according to his expression) in the aggre-
gate excess demand functions. (Olivera 1999, vi)
On the other hand, he felt that in all cases in which he could apply his 
algorithm, the excess demand functions were precisely continuous, homo-
geneous of degree zero, and satisfied Walras’s law. 
Then Mantel read Sonnenschein’s (1973) paper in which it was conjec-
tured that those properties were the only ones that could be derived for 
generic excess demand functions. Sonnenschein used the argument that 
any polynomial function with these properties could be decomposed in a 
number of functions that may arise from the maximization of preferences 
by individual consumers. This is interpreted as that, for any excess demand 
function that is continuous, homogeneous of degree zero, and obeys Wal-
ras’s law, there can be found an economy in which this function arises 
from the maximization of individual preferences. The problem with Son-
nenschein’s construction is that the number of individuals in the economy 
depends on the degree of the polynomial excess demand function. 
Mantel was more than aware of the implications of this work. In fact, he 
readily produced a construction that generalized Sonnenschein’s. Before 
presenting Mantel’s result, I introduce some previous definitions. 
Assume an economy of n commodities, in which prices are trimmed by 
ε (more precisely, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, ε ≤ pj ≤ [1/(ε)], where pj is a price of 
good j). Fn(ε) is the space of functions with range ℜn and domain the space 
of ε-trimmed prices. Assume that each f ∈ Fn(ε) verifies the following:
1.  Continuity. 
2.  Homogeneity: f (λp) = f (p) for every ε-trimmed vector of prices p 
and for every λ > 0. 
3.  Walras’s law: p · f(p) = 0 for all ε-trimmed vectors of prices p.
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An excess demand f is said to be generated by an economy with n 
commodities, if there exists a certain number of individuals, 1, …, K 
such that each individual excess demand function fk of an individual k 
arises maximizing uk(x) over the budget constraint p · x ≤ p · ωk, then 
f (p) = ∑Kk=1 f k(p) for every ε-trimmed vector of prices p. Let Gn(ε) be 
the set of all the market excess demand functions generated by an n 
commodities economy in this way. Finally, let Ln(ε) be the space of 
continuously differentiable functions with range ℜn and domain the 
space of ε-trimmed prices that verify a mild Lipschitz condition on the 
first derivative, namely, that for each g ∈ Ln(ε) there exists a constant K 
such that
g p + ∂g
∂p p ⋅ q – p ≤ g q + K p – q
2
where p and q are ε-trimmed prices. 
Then Mantel (1974) states the following: 
Theorem 1. For all ε > 0, Fn(ε) ∩ Ln(ε) ⊂ Gn(ε). Furthermore, the set 
of pure trade n commodities economies can be restricted to have at 
most 2n consumers. 
What is interesting for our argument is how Mantel proved this claim. He 
constructs an economy with 2n consumers; the first n have sort of “Cobb-
Douglas” utility functions, with demands satisfying the strong axiom of 
revealed preference. Adding their excess demands and subtracting from 
a given f ∈ Fn(ε), the remainder can be seen as the sum of the excess 
demands of the other n consumers, which also satisfy the strong axiom 
of revealed preference. 
His proof was typical of his work: constructive and easily verifiable. 
In fact, it shows his idiosyncratic style of mathematical argumentation, 
which he deemed “experimental mathematics.” That is, before proving 
the claim he tried to find either an example or a counterexample. In both 
cases, it had to show clearly why the claim was true or false. This non-
Bourbakian type of mathematical work was more like the approach of 
a computer scientist than that of an economist. In any case, the paper is 
extremely constructive and can be easily followed with an understanding 
of how to add and subtract differentiable functions. 
Later that same year, Debreu was able to prove that F n(ε) ⊂ Gn(ε) in 
economies with just n consumers, which is the definitive claim as known 
today. For Mantel’s goal of finding a computational non-fixed-point argu-
ment of the existence of equilibrium, this was a heavy blow, since it showed 
that Uzawa’s result was generic. 
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Hugo Sonnenschein conjectured that microeconomic theory does not 
put constraints on the shape of the aggregate demand function, except 
for the aforementioned properties. He showed this for the case of a spe-
cial family of functions. Later the author could show that this is so in 
much more general cases. As for many other topics, the last word was 
Debreu’s, who proved the complete equivalence. With these investiga-
tions a full proof was given for Uzawa’s claim that the mathematical 
problem of Kakutani and the economic one of Walras are equivalent 
from the logical point of view. 
It took me time to realize that I was looking for something we now 
know it cannot be obtained. There are no methods to calculate equi-
librium solution that do not also yield a fixed-point result. (Mantel 
1985, 27)
Even so, Mantel was glad to settle this question, since this result also 
meant that fixed-point arguments could be computationally implemented, 
a useful outcome in terms of the potential applications he had in mind: 
It is regrettable that the abundant work on this topic [applied general 
equilibrium] does not include Argentinian examples, despite the fact 
that the techniques are well known here since their very inception. . . . 
Let us hope that this situation will change in the future and these new 
methods will be applied to determine economic policies to ensure the 
progress and welfare of Argentina. (331)
4. Mantel and the Limitations  
of General Equilibrium Theory
What were Mantel’s own ideas about the consequences of his results? 
Besides the terse mentions in a couple of printed works, he was very care-
ful with his public expressions, but in private he held two interesting ideas. 
One was that something, highly relevant for determining economic out-
comes, is missing in the theoretical characterization of an economy. More-
over, Mantel contended that many of the usual assumptions in GET are 
just crude mathematical proxies for real-world properties. He felt, for 
example, that assuming an invariant structure of preferences was some-
thing that economic theory would dispose of sooner or later: 
In the field of optimal growth theory, since Ramsey’s time it is fre-
quent . . . [to assume] a constant rate of preference. Such an optimality 
criterion implies that preferences are independent over time. Follow-
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ing in the tradition of Irving Fisher [Mantel] . . . showed that there 
exist welfare functions for which the . . . preferences are variable. 
(Mantel 1999c, 331)9
His other idea was highly influenced by his experience as a professor of 
both economic policy and Marxist economics at the Universidad de Bue-
nos Aires. Taught in the heyday of political turmoil and popular sympa-
thy for left-wing policies, his courses were seen as “rightist” by radical 
students who despised his formal approach.10 In the almost empty class-
rooms in which he taught, he concentrated on the computational aspects 
of the subjects. Drawing on his own experience in the design of the plan-
ning system, he claimed that no matter which political leaning they could 
have, economic policies must always take into account the political, social, 
and institutional aspects of the economy: 
Economics is a social science, and as such it analyzes part of the behav-
ior of societies. . . . Economic theory seeks systematic explanations 
for all the aspects of the phenomena of production, distribution, and 
consumption of goods and services. The theory of economic policies 
intends to determine the means to control the economic process in order 
to improve the allocation of resources in those activities. (Mantel 1999f, 
166–67)
While this may sound like a platitude, Mantel considered seriously how 
to incorporate these items in his planning system. He readily acknowl-
edged that these factors reduce drastically the number of alternative out-
comes and prices. This reduction in degrees of freedom has a good side: 
it is no longer easy to find a “mock” economy. 
The bottom line of Mantel’s ideas is that fully characterizing the infor-
mation in an economy requires, contrary to the assumptions of method-
ological individualism, incorporating factors not held by any agent but by 
the economy as a whole. Prices are just part of that picture, but not enough 
to yield a complete panorama of the economy: 
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9. He used time-varying preferences to explore a problem that he thought was urgent to 
solve: how to ensure economic growth with equality (Mantel 1995, 1999c). 
10. Curiously enough, after being attacked by the Left, he was reprimanded a little later by 
a right-wing chancellor of the Universidad de Buenos Aires for not “properly reporting” to 
the authorities about the purpose of a trip to Harvard in which he finished a paper (1974) in 
the same vein as McFadden, Mas-Colell, Mantel, and Richter 1974. Mantel’s overall experi-
ence at the university was quite negative. He bitterly resigned in 1985 after a series of offenses, 
which he poignantly described in a letter to the newspaper Clarin (Buenos Aires) on 20 Decem-
ber of that year. 
To determine optimal economic policies there are three fundamental 
elements. In the first place a description of the economic system. . . . 
In second place a social welfare relation that allows [a planner] to 
evaluate goals. . . . In the third place, it is necessary to know the limits 
which constrain how variables may change without losing their mean-
ingfulness for both the model and the social preferences. (Mantel 1999d, 
229–30)
It is clear that it was troublesome for someone trained in the Cowles tradi-
tion but with a strong computational bent to see how to design a model 
with all the desired properties. Even so, Mantel sought in many ways, 
always using his mathematical experiments (both by hand and by com-
puter), to find better economic models, able to explain and predict at the 
same time. His numerous papers written in Spanish, in which he applied 
this approach to analyzing the troubled Argentinian economy, show how 
deeply he felt about the appropriate method of economic argumentation. 
Always prone to revisit his work of the 1970s, he made his last attempt 
at that in 1995 (Mantel 1999a). There, the constructivity of his approach 
and the connections with his planning system are evident. His goal in this 
last work was to find a mock economy of n Leontief agents from a limited 
number of observations of the aggregate demand. The idea, of course, 
was to find ways to rationalize real-world data. Instead of seeking the real 
economy, he had to look for a good approximation because of the lack of 
enough information. The goodness of fit would help, like in his computer 
system of 1971, calibrate the properties of the mock economy. 
Mantel died in 1999, before knowing that some authors questioned the 
general validity of the proofs of Sonnenschein’s conjecture (e.g., Chiap-
pori and Ekeland 1999). He would have disagreed with them, because he 
felt that the result was consistent with other aspects of economic theory. 
In any case, he preferred to use whatever he had at hand to attack more 
worldly and pressing problems. The final balance is that the computational 
economist won out over the theorist.
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